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Resilience and Regulation: U.S. Grants Samsung and SK Hynix Annual Licenses for China Operations in 2026

SEOUL/WASHINGTON NEWS NOW — In a move that provides a vital but cautious reprieve for the global semiconductor supply chain, the United States government has officially granted annual export licenses to South Korean tech titans Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. These licenses, valid through 2026, allow the firms to continue shipping critical American chipmaking equipment to their manufacturing facilities located in mainland China.

The decision, confirmed by sources familiar with the matter on Tuesday, marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to technology decoupling. While it offers “temporary relief” for the world’s two largest memory chipmakers, it also signals the end of the broad, indefinite waivers that had previously shielded these companies from the brunt of U.S.-China trade hostilities.


The New Framework: From “Indefinite” to “Annual” Scrutiny

For years, Samsung, SK Hynix, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) operated under a privilege known as Validated End-User (VEU) status. This designation allowed them to bring in U.S.-origin tools without seeking individual licenses for every shipment.

However, under the direction of President Donald Trump’s administration, that era of predictability is coming to a close.

  • Deadline: The current VEU status for these facilities is set to expire on December 31, 2025.
  • The Shift: Starting January 1, 2026, all shipments will be governed by an annual approval system.
  • Impact: Every 12 months, the U.S. Department of Commerce will reassess the geopolitical landscape and the technical sophistication of the tools being shipped before renewing the license.

The shift reflects the administration’s stance that previous export controls—implemented during the Biden era—were “too relaxed” and failed to sufficiently stymie China’s progress in indigenous advanced manufacturing.


Why China Remains “Mission Critical”

Despite intense pressure to “de-risk” and move production to South Korea or the United States, China remains an indispensable hub for both firms.

  • Samsung’s Xi’an Plant: This facility is responsible for roughly 40% of Samsung’s global NAND flash production. Any disruption here would send shockwaves through the consumer electronics and enterprise storage markets.
  • SK Hynix’s Wuxi and Dalian Fabs: The Wuxi plant accounts for nearly half of SK Hynix’s DRAM output, while the Dalian site (acquired from Intel) is a cornerstone of its NAND strategy.

“China is not just a market for us; it is a vital part of our global manufacturing backbone,” an industry insider noted. “The demand for traditional memory chips has surged due to the global AI data center boom. Without these plants running at capacity, the ‘AI gold rush’ hits a massive hardware bottleneck.”


Strategic Balancing Act: AI Demand vs. National Security

The approval comes at a time of record-high prices for memory. As AI companies like Nvidia and OpenAI scramble for high-bandwidth memory (HBM) and traditional DRAM, the U.S. government faces a delicate balancing act:

  1. Objective A: Prevent China from acquiring the “EUV” (Extreme Ultraviolet) lithography tools needed to make sub-7nm chips.
  2. Objective B: Ensure that global AI infrastructure—largely led by American firms—does not collapse due to a shortage of memory chips produced in Chinese factories.

By moving to an annual license, Washington retains “leverage.” It allows the factories to remain operational but gives U.S. regulators the power to “turn off the tap” if they detect technology leakage or if Beijing retaliates in other sectors.


Comparative Landscape: 2026 Global IC Production

CompanyKey China ProductionGlobal Market Share (Memory)U.S. License Status
SamsungNAND Flash (Xi’an)~33%Approved for 2026
SK HynixDRAM (Wuxi) / NAND (Dalian)~24%Approved for 2026
TSMCLogic Chips (Nanjing/Shanghai)~60% (Foundry)Pending/Reviewing

Looking Ahead: The “China+1” Strategy

While the 2026 license provides a window of stability, the message from Washington is clear: the long-term future of advanced chipmaking belongs outside of China. Both Samsung and SK Hynix have significantly increased their capital expenditure in the U.S. and South Korea.

  • Samsung is currently investing $44 billion in a massive semiconductor hub in Taylor, Texas.
  • SK Hynix has committed billions to an advanced packaging facility in Indiana.

For now, the chips will keep flowing, and the machines will keep humming in Xi’an and Wuxi. But for the leaders of the semiconductor world, 2026 is merely a “stay of execution” in an ongoing geopolitical chess match.

Frequently Asked Questions: U.S. Chipmaking Licenses for China (2026)

Following the U.S. government’s decision to grant annual licenses to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix for their Chinese operations, several questions have emerged regarding the future of the global semiconductor supply chain. Below are the most frequent inquiries and their answers in approximately 500 words.


1. What exactly was approved by the U.S. government?

The U.S. Department of Commerce has granted an annual export license to Samsung and SK Hynix. This allows them to continue shipping U.S.-made semiconductor manufacturing equipment to their facilities in China throughout the year 2026. This move provides “temporary relief” for the companies, ensuring their existing factories remain operational despite tightening trade restrictions.

2. Why is this different from previous years?

In the past, these companies benefited from Validated End-User (VEU) status. This was essentially a “blanket waiver” that allowed them to import tools indefinitely without applying for individual licenses.

  • The Change: That VEU status expires on December 31, 2025.
  • The New System: Starting in 2026, the U.S. is moving to an annual approval system. This means the government will re-evaluate and must re-approve these shipments every single year, giving Washington significantly more oversight and leverage.

3. Which facilities are affected?

The primary facilities involved are:

  • Samsung: Its massive Xi’an NAND flash plant, which produces approximately 40% of Samsung’s total global NAND output.
  • SK Hynix: Its Wuxi DRAM plant and the Dalian NAND facility (formerly owned by Intel).

4. Does this mean the companies can expand their Chinese factories?

No. Sources indicate that while the licenses allow for the maintenance and continued operation of existing lines, the U.S. policy generally strictly prohibits shipments intended for capacity expansion or technology upgrades to more advanced process nodes. The goal is to keep the current global supply stable without allowing China to gain an edge in next-generation chip technology.

5. Why did the U.S. grant these licenses at all?

The decision is a strategic balancing act. Samsung and SK Hynix provide a massive portion of the world’s “legacy” or “traditional” memory chips. A sudden shutdown of their Chinese plants would cause a global hardware shortage, skyrocketing prices for everything from smartphones to the servers that power Artificial Intelligence (AI) data centers. By granting annual licenses, the U.S. avoids a global economic shock while still keeping the companies on a “short leash.”

6. What about TSMC?

While Samsung and SK Hynix have reportedly secured their 2026 status, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) is also affected by the revocation of VEU status for its Nanjing plant. As of late December 2025, TSMC has not officially confirmed an identical annual license, though industry experts expect a similar arrangement to maintain global supply chain stability.

7. What is the long-term outlook for these plants?

The shift to annual licenses is a clear signal that the U.S. wants to decouple advanced manufacturing from China over time. Both companies are already pivoting:

  • Samsung is investing billions in Texas.
  • SK Hynix is expanding in South Korea and Indiana.

The 2026 license is a bridge, not a permanent solution.

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